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Imagine that several foreign countries sue a handful of United
States tobacco companies in Florida state court. The foreign countries
claim fraud, misrepresentation, and negligence on the part of the to-
bacco companies, and seek compensation from the companies for the
costs of treating those with tobacco-related illnesses. The tobacco
companies remove the cases to a Florida federal district court, and
then successfully move to transfer them to a Delaware federal district
court. Only, once the cases arrive, the Delaware district court decides
that the tobacco companies' jurisdictional argument is incorrect, and
thus that the cases were improvidently removed. The Delaware dis-
trict court then is statutorily required to return the case to state court.
The question is, how should the Delaware court send back the
case? Can the Delaware federal court remand the cases directly to the
Florida state court from which they were originally removed? Or must
the cases be retransferred to the Florida federal court for remand to
the Florida state court? The answer matters for the reviewability of
the district court's disposition of the case on appeal. District courts'
transfer orders are generally reviewable by federal appellate courts;'
t B.A. 1998, Georgetown University; J.D. Candidate 2003, The University of Chicago.
1 This hypothetical is loosely based on the facts of Republic of Venezuela v Philip Morris
Inc, 287 F3d 192,194-96 (DC Cir 2002) and Bloom v Barry, 755 F2d 356,356-57 (3d Cir 1985).
2 See 28 USC § 1441(a) (2000) (permitting removal to federal court of any civil action of
which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction). According to the to-
bacco companies, federal subject matter jurisdiction is premised on the federal common law of
foreign relations: The plaintiffs are foreign sovereigns whose vital and material interests are at
stake in the lawsuits. See Philip Morris, 287 F3d at 197.
3 See 28 USC § 1404(a) (2000) ("For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the in-
terest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division
where it might have been brought.").
4 See 28 USC § 1447(c) (2000) ("If at any time before final judgment it appears that the
district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded.") (emphasis added).
See also American Fire & Casualty Co v Finn, 341 US 6, 18 (1951) (explaining the "wrongful ex-
tension of federal jurisdiction" that would result from permitting removal of cases over which
federal courts lack original jurisdiction).
5 See, for example, In re Dow Coming Corp, 86 F3d 482, 487-88 (6th Cir 1996) (treating
the partial denial of a Section 157(b)(5) transfer motion as a final, immediately appealable or-
der); Sunbelt Corp v Noble, Denton & Associates, Inc, 5 F3d 28, 30 (3d Cir 1993) (reviewing the
grant of a Section 1404(a) transfer motion by writ of mandamus); In re Ricoh Corp, 870 F2d 570,
572 & n 4 (11th Cir 1989) (reviewing the denial of a Section 1404(a) transfer motion by writ of
mandamus); Hustler Magazine, Inc v United States District Court for the District of Wyoming, 790
F2d 69, 70 (10th Cir 1986) (reviewing the denial of a Section 1404(a) transfer motion by writ of
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their remand orders generally are not.6 If the Delaware district court
may remand the cases directly to the Florida state court, that remand
order would not be subject to appellate review, whereas an order sim-
ply retransferring the cases to the Florida federal court would be re-
viewable.7
At first glance, remand by a federal district court to a state court
outside its district-or what might be called a cross-jurisdictional re-
mand-is intuitively appealing. Why not accomplish in a single step
what would otherwise require two, especially given the crowded
docket of federal courts? 8 This argument for efficiency may be particu-
larly powerful as applied to cross-jurisdictional remands, which,
though relatively rare,' are likely to arise when there are a number of
cases or claims at issue.'" However, that a particular procedure is effi-
cient does not mean that Congress has authorized its use. In fact, the
relevant remand statutes either prohibit or do not address directly the
practice of cross-jurisdictional remand-a problem that courts largely
have elided by failing to question their statutory authority to remand
cases cross-jurisdictionally.
This Comment explores the propriety and wisdom of cross-
jurisdictional remands. Part I describes both the various contexts in
which courts can be presented with the opportunity to order cross-
jurisdictional remand and the legal consequences of courts' proce-
dural choices. Part II explains why interpreting the relevant remand
statutes to allow cross-jurisdictional remand, as have most courts to
face the issue, proves difficult to square with Supreme Court jurispru-
mandamus); A.H. Robins Co, Inc v Piccinin, 788 F2d 994, 1009 (4th Cir 1986) (reviewing a Sec-
tion 157(b)(5) transfer order despite lack of finality because of the "relaxed rule of appealabil-
ity" in bankruptcy cases); In re Scott, 709 F2d 717,718-19 (DC Cir 1983) (reviewing the grant of
a Section 1404(a) transfer motion by writ of mandamus); Hayman Cash Register Co v Sarokin,
669 F2d 162, 164 (3d Cir 1982) (reviewing a 1406(a) transfer order by writ of mandamus).
6 See Part I.A.4.a.
7 Transfer orders normally are reviewed by writ of mandamus, which courts classify as an
"extraordinary remedy" that may only be granted on a showing of "clear and indisputable" right
to issuance of the writ. See, for example, Mallard v United States District Court for Southern Dis-
trict of Iowa, 490 US 296, 309 (1989). This somewhat diminishes the advantages of retransfer to
litigants. Nevertheless, there are still advantages to litigants and to the judicial system from a sys-
tem of retransfer over cross-jurisdictional remand. See Parts I.A.4 (advantages to litigants) and
III.C.3 (advantages to the judicial system).
8 For a general discussion, see Richard A. Posner, The Federal Courts: Crisis and Reform
chs 3-4 (Harvard 1985) (detailing the growth of the federal caseload and its consequences for
the judiciary).
9 See In re Federal-Mogul Global, Inc, 282 BR 301, 316 (Bankr D Del 2002) ("[I]t is rare
for a District Court in one state to remand a matter to the state courts of another state .... ).
10 See Part I.B. Its rarity is even more misleading if there are a number of cases that could
be, but currently are not, remanded directly across jurisdictional lines. In fact, cases removed
from state to federal court comprise about 12 percent of the total civil workload of federal dis-
trict courts. The Administrative Office of the United States Courts does not have available statis-
tics on the number of cases that are transferred post-removal.
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dence and with the text of the statutes themselves. Part III then pro-
poses a reading of the various remand statutes that is consistent with
their text as well as the Court's jurisprudence, arguing that courts
should eschew cross-jurisdictional remands.
I. How CROSS-JURISDICTIONAL REMANDS CAN ARISE
This Part discusses the different federal statutes that govern re-
moval, transfer, and remand with an eye toward how cross-
jurisdictional remands can arise. It begins with a general discussion of
removal, transfer, and remand in the federal courts. It then surveys
statutes that specifically govern multidistrict litigation ("MDL") and
bankruptcy cases, and uses MDL and bankruptcy cases that involve
cross-jurisdictional remand to highlight the importance of the remand
issue to litigants.
A. Cross-Jurisdictional Remands in General
1. Removal.
Removal is the "judicial curiosity" that allows defendants to re-
move an action properly brought by the plaintiff in a state court to a
federal district court." Removal is a purely statutory right authorized
by Congress,'2 and there are a number of federal statutes that allow for
removal in certain circumstances. For example, the general removal
statute, 28 USC § 1441, permits the defendant to remove any civil ac-
tion that might have been brought originally in federal district court.3
Similarly, in the bankruptcy context, 28 USC § 1452 permits removal
of any claim or cause of action'4 that falls within the bankruptcy juris-
diction of the federal district court for the district in which the claim
or cause of action is pending."
The procedure for removal is simple. A defendant wishing to re-
move a civil action simply need file a notice of removal with the fed-
11 Tinney v McClain, 76 F Supp 694,698 (ND Tex 1948).
12 The limits of removal are subject to Congress's discretion. See Martin v Hunter's Lessee,
14 US (1 Wheat) 304, 349 (1816) (Story) ("The time, the process, and the manner" of removal
"must be subject to [Congress's] absolute legislative control.").
13 28 USC § 1441(a). Section 1441 is subject to a number of statutory exceptions, not rele-
vant here, in which Congress has prohibited removal of actions even though they are within the
original subject matter jurisdiction of the federal courts.
14 28 USC § 1452(a) (2000). There is an exception in Section 1452(a) prohibiting removal
of any claims or causes of action from proceedings before the United States Tax Court or civil
actions by a governmental unit to enforce its police or regulatory power. See id.
15 The bankruptcy jurisdiction of the federal district courts is defined by Section 1334 of Ti-
tle 28. The district courts have original and exclusive jurisdiction of all cases under the Bank-
ruptcy Code. See 28 USC § 1334(a) (2000). They have concurrent original jurisdiction over any
other civil proceedings that arise under the Bankruptcy Code or that arise in or are related to
bankruptcy cases. See 28 USC § 1334(b).
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eral district court for the district or division in which the state action is
pending, after which the action proceeds in the federal court as if it
had been filed originally there. 6 The propriety of the removal then is
subject to challenge in the federal court, and the federal court may de-
cide at any time during the litigation-on its own motion or at a
party's urging-that it lacks federal subject matter jurisdiction and
that the case was improperly removed." In the absence of subject mat-
ter jurisdiction, Section 1447(c) requires the federal court to remand,
or send back, the case to state court."
2. Transfer.
The issue of cross-jurisdictional remand would never arise if cases
were only removed from a state court to the federal district court for
the district in which the state court is located, and then remanded to
that same state court in the absence of federal jurisdiction. However,
once a case has been removed to federal court, there are several ways
in which a case can be transferred to another federal district court. It
is this combination of removal and transfer that gives rise to the pos-
sibility of a cross-jurisdictional remand.
For instance, 28 USC §§ 1404(a) and 1406(a) permit a district
court to transfer an action to any other district in which the action
might have, or should have, been brought." If a case is improperly re-
moved, but the district court to which the case is removed transfers
the case before discovering the removal's impropriety, the case is ripe
for a cross-jurisdictional remand." Even if the case was properly re-
16 See 28 USC § 1446 (2000). The defendant in a civil action also must give written notice
of removal to the plaintiff and file a copy of the notice of removal with the state court in which
the action originated. See Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller, and Edward H. Cooper, 14C
Federal Practice and Procedure: Jurisdiction § 3738 at 249-51 (West 3d ed 1998).
17 See, for example, Franchise Tax Board v Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 US 1,
8 (1983) ("[I]f it appears before final judgment that a case was not properly removed, because it
was not within the original jurisdiction of the United States district courts, the district court must
remand it to the state court from which it was removed."); Mints v Educational Testing Service,
99 F3d 1253,1258 (3d Cir 1996) (noting a district court's independent duty to remand for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction); American Policyholders Insurance Co v Nyacol Products, Inc, 989
F2d 1256, 1258, 1264 (1st Cir 1993) (ordering the case remanded, based on the court's "unflag-
ging duty" to ensure, sua sponte, its subject matter jurisdiction).
18 See 28 USC § 1447(c).
19 The distinction between the two provisions depends on whether the initial, pre-transfer
venue is a proper one. Compare 28 USC § 1404(a) (governing transfer of properly venued
claims), with 28 USC § 1406(a) (2000) (governing transfer of improperly venued claims).
20 The transferor court may transfer the case before ruling on a motion to remand, or its
ruling that the case was properly removed may be reconsidered by the transferee court. Law of
the case principles do not preclude reconsideration of subject matter jurisdiction. See, for exam-
ple, Christianson v Colt Industries Operating Corp, 486 US 800,817 (1988) (permitting transferee
federal court to reexamine transferor federal court's jurisdictional determination). However,
courts should revisit jurisdictional determinations of coordinate courts prior to transfer only
when those determinations are clearly erroneous. See id at 819, citing Fogel v Chestnutt, 668 F2d
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moved and transferred, subsequent events may leave the claims lack-
ing any independent basis for federal jurisdiction. For example, at the
time of removal and transfer, a case may contain a federal question
and supplemental state law claims, and yet the federal question is
compromised or dismissed post-transfer. The transferee district court
may then elect to remand the pending state law claims cross-
jurisdictionally.
3. Remand.
No matter how the case fails to present federal jurisdiction, the
absence of federal jurisdiction means that the case must be remanded
to state court. For the purposes of this Comment, the two relevant re-
mand provisions are 28 USC § 1447(c), the general procedural provi-
sion governing remand after removal, and 28 USC § 1452(b), the pro-
vision governing remand of removed claims "related to" bankruptcy.21
The former does not address directly the procedural mechanism by
which remand is to be accomplished, while the latter expressly disal-
lows cross-jurisdictional remand.
a) General remand provision: Section 1447(c). The general re-
mand provision, Section 1447(c), authorizes a federal court to remand
a removed case if the federal court lacks subject matter jurisdiction or
if there was a defect in the removal procedure." In fact, Section
1447(c) requires that "[i]f at any time before final judgment it appears
that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall
be remanded."'" What Section 1447(c) does not make explicit, how-
ever, is which court shall remand a case that has been improperly re-
moved and then transferred. At first glance, the command appears
aimed at the district court that finds subject matter jurisdiction is lack-
ing. However, as discussed below in Part II.A, this interpretation
proves difficult to square with Supreme Court jurisprudence concern-
ing both the general and bankruptcy remand provisions.
b) Bankruptcy remand provision: Section 1452(b). Although
the general remand provision applies in most contexts, bankruptcy
cases or claims are subject to a more specific remand provision. The
bankruptcy remand provision, Section 1452(b), states in relevant part
that "[t]he court to which such claim or cause of action is removed
may remand such claim or cause of action on any equitable ground.""4
Unlike the general remand provision, the bankruptcy remand provi-
100, 109 (2d Cir 1981) ("The law of the case will be disregarded only when the court has 'a clear
conviction of error."') (citation omitted).
21 See 28 USC § 1447(c); 28 USC § 1452(b).
22 See 28 USC § 1447(c).
23 Id.
24 28 USC § 1452(b).
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sion makes clear which court must remand the claim or cause of ac-
tion: A claim removed from state court may be remanded by the fed-
eral "court to which [it] is removed," rather than by any subsequent
federal court to which it is transferred."
4. Appellate review.
a) Scope of review. While Section 1447(c) authorizes the re-
mand of removed cases, Section 1447(d) precludes review "by appeal
or otherwise" of those remand orders." Like Section 1447(d), Section
1452(b) also bars appellate review of bankruptcy remand orders, 7 al-
though it specifies the statutory provisions under which review may
not be obtained.2 Despite the seemingly unambiguous text of Section
1447(d), the Supreme Court created an important exception to
1447(d)'s bar on appellate review in Thermtron Products, Inc v Her-
mansdorfer.29
In Thermtron, the district court remanded the case because its
docket was too crowded to enable it to hear the case expeditiously. 3
The Supreme Court held that appellate courts may review remand or-
ders based on reasons other than those articulated in Section 1447(c).
That is, they may review remand orders not based on either (1) a lack
of subject matter jurisdiction or (2) a defect in the removal proce-
dure.31 The Court reasoned that Sections 1447(c) and (d) must be read
in pari materia: The ban on appellate review prescribed by Section
1447(d) is limited to remand orders based on the grounds for rejecting
removal authorized by Section 1447(c).2
Despite the plain language of Section 1447(d), Thermtron has
permitted review of a slew of substantive challenges to remand or-
25 Section 1452(b) confers the power to remand a bankruptcy claim only on "[tihe court to
which such claim or cause of action is removed." 28 USC § 1452(b). To the extent that a trans-
feree court relies instead on an alleged "inherent" power to remand a bankruptcy claim, see In re
Federal-Mogul Global, Inc, 282 BR 301,317 (Bankr D Del 2002), Section 1452(b)'s bar on appel-
late review is not implicated. It applies solely to remand orders entered pursuant to Section
1452(b) itself. See 28 USC § 1452(b) ("The court to which such claim or cause of action is re-
moved may remand such claim or cause of action on any equitable ground. An order entered
under this subsection remanding a claim or cause of action ... is not reviewable by appeal or oth-
erwise .. ") (emphasis added). For further discussion of this point, see text accompanying note
108.
26 See 28 USC § 1447(d) ("An order remanding a case to the State court from which it was
removed is not reviewable on appeal or otherwise.").
27 See 28 USC § 1452(b).
28 See text accompanying notes 125-28.
29 423 US 336 (1976).
30 See id at 340-41 & n 3.
31 See 28 USC § 1447(c).
32 See Thermtron, 423 US at 345-46 ("[O]nly remand orders issued under § 1447(c) and
invoking the grounds specified therein... are immune from review under § 1447(d).").
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ders.3 In other words, litigants may claim that a district court acted
outside its statutory authority in deciding to remand for a reason not
contemplated by the remand statutes. By the same token, if the re-
mand statutes do not authorize the practice of cross-jurisdictional re-
mand, then these procedural challenges should also result in appellate
review of cross-jurisdictional remand orders. Litigants should be able
to claim that a district court acted outside its statutory authority in de-
ciding to remand in a way not contemplated by the remand statutes.
Of course, an appellate court might confine its review to the pro-
cedural error without reaching the merits of the jurisdictional deter-
mination. In other words, even if the appellate court were to con-
clude that the district court had erred in cross-jurisdictionally remand-
ing, it might only order the district court to retransfer. However, this
retransfer order would itself be reviewable once entered.35 Just as im-
portantly, it is unclear what would authorize an appellate court only to
consider the procedural question and not the underlying jurisdictional
issues. The bar to appellate review in Section 1447(d) has been lifted
in order to consider the remand order at all; what then prevents re-
view of the order in its entirety?
Perhaps the bar has been lifted only as to the procedural error,
since the district court is only claimed to have exceeded its statutory
authority in resolving that issue. Of course, nothing in the statutory
text compels this result, and it is hard to see what good would be
served by partial review. If the purpose of immunizing remand orders
from appellate review is "to prevent delay in the trial of remanded
cases by protracted litigation of jurisdictional issues,"3 then that pur-
pose has already been defeated to the extent that Thermtron allows
appellate review. If the remand order is to be reviewed, the time saved
by partial review should be balanced against the risk that the litigants
have lost a federal forum to which they are entitled.37 Indeed, the time
added by review of the jurisdictional issues may be marginal: An ap-
pellate court is already looking at the merits, in effect, in order to as-
sess whether there is appellate jurisdiction. Without knowing the true
33 See, for example, Thomas R. Hrdlick, Appellate Review of Remand Orders in Removed
Cases: Are They Losing Their Appeal?, 82 Marq L Rev 535, 562 (1999) (arguing that Section
1447(c), as amended in 1996, swallows the Thermtron exception of reviewability for substantive
challenges to remand orders). See also In re Amoco Petroleum Additives Co, 964 F2d 706, 708
(7th Cir 1992) (Easterbrook) (noting that Thermtron is contrary to the text of Section 1447(c)
and has produced confusion among lower courts).
34 See Allied Signal Recovery Trust v Allied Signal Inc, 298 F3d 263,271 (3d Cir 2002) (or-
dering retransfer of a case that had been cross-jurisdictionally remanded, but declining to con-
sider whether there was federal jurisdiction).
35 See text accompanying notes 5-7.
36 Thermtron, 423 US at 351.
37 See text accompanying note 156.
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ground for the district court's decision to remand, the appellate court
cannot know whether the district court remanded on a ground outside
its statutory authority.
b) Standard of review. Suppose that a district court orders a
cross-jurisdictional remand, and then the appellate court considers at
least the procedural question and orders that the case be retrans-
ferred. Transfer orders normally are reviewed by writ of mandamus,
which courts classify as an "extraordinary remedy" that may only be
granted on a showing of "clear and indisputable" right to issuance of
the writ." This diminishes the advantages of retransfer to litigants. Is
the game worth the candle?
It probably is, even beyond the obvious set of cases in which the
retransfer order is sufficiently flawed to justify mandamus. First, what-
ever the advantages to litigants, the judicial system as a whole still may
profit from a system of retransfer over cross-jurisdictional remand.39
Second, and more specifically to litigants, retransfer rather than re-
mand may be of special importance in the bankruptcy context. Courts
have noted that "Congress intended to allow for immediate appeal in
bankruptcy cases of orders that 'finally dispose of discrete disputes in
the larger case."'° A retransfer order removes a claim from the bank-
ruptcy court and returns it to the federal court from whence it came,
all for the purpose of sending the claim back to the state court in
which it originated. Because the retransfer order "finally dispose[s] of
[a] discrete dispute[] within the larger case," there is good reason for
courts to review these orders by a lesser standard than mandamus,
whether as final or collateral orders. In this way, a court's choice be-
tween retransfer and cross-jurisdictional remand can be quite impor-
tant to the litigants.
B. Cross-Jurisdictional Remands in Specific Contexts
Multidistrict litigation and bankruptcy provide good examples of
why the issue of cross-jurisdictional remand can be so important to
litigants, particularly defendants. These types of cases can involve
hundreds or even thousands of cases or claims that have been re-
moved, transferred, and then consolidated in particular courts." Cross-
jurisdictional remand is most likely in these cases, because collapsing
retransfer and remand into a single step appears significantly more ef-
38 Mallard v United States District Court for Southern District of Iowa, 490 US 296, 309
(1989).
39 See Part III.C.3.
40 In re Sonnax Industries, 907 F2d 1280, 1283 (2d Cir 1990), quoting In re Saco Local De-
velopment Corp, 711 F2d 441,444 (1st Cir 1983) (Breyer).
41 See, for example, In re Federal-Mogul Global, Inc, 300 F3d 368, 372-73 (3d Cir 2002)
(discussing the procedural path of the thousands of personal injury claims before the court).
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ficient. Procedural challenges are an additional means for litigants to
garner appellate review and retain the federal fora they covet., How-
ever, recent MDL and bankruptcy cases reveal that litigants have
failed to raise procedural challenges; or that, when they have pressed
such challenges, district courts have responded with confusion and
have not elicited meaningful guidance from circuit court opinions.
1. Multidistrict litigation.
Section 1407, which established the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict
Litigation, provides for the transfer to a single district of all civil ac-
tions that are pending in different districts involving one or more
common- questions of fact. 3 Defendants can remove a case from state
to federal court and then initiate a reference to the Judicial Panel by
claiming that similar cases are pending in another federal district
court." As with transfer under Sections 1404(a) and 1406(a), the Judi-
cial Panel may enter a transfer order or conditional transfer order be-
fore the plaintiff has an opportunity to file, or the original district
court has an opportunity to rule on, a motion to remand.45
Republic of Venezuela v Philip Morris Inc, 6 a recent case from
the D.C. Circuit, demonstrates the significance of appellate review of
remand orders in the multidistrict litigation context, and why litigants
might benefit by challenging cross-jurisdictional remands on proce-
dural grounds. Philip Morris involved six suits filed by various foreign
countries against United States tobacco companies in Florida state
court.7 The tobacco companies then removed to the United States
42 See, for example, Kevin M. Clermont and Theodore Eisenberg, Do Case Outcomes
Really Reveal Anything about the Legal System? Win Rates and Removal Jurisdiction, 83 Cornell
L Rev 581 (1998) (finding that successful removal significantly improves the defendant's chances
of prevailing on the merits).
43 See 28 USC § 1407 (2000); Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller, and Edward H. Coo-
per, 15 Federal Practice and Procedure: Jurisdiction § 3862 at 502 (West 2d ed 1986). Although
Section 1407 only provides for transfer for pretrial treatment, in practice transferee courts often
see the cases through to settlement or trial. See id at 503-04. But see Lexecon Inc v Milberg
Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 523 US 26, 40 (1998) (holding that a district court that trans-
ferred a case for pretrial proceedings under Section 1407 may not use Section 1404(a) to transfer
the case to itself for trial).
44 See 28 USC § 1407(a) (The Judicial Panel will transfer an action upon determination
that transfer "will be for the convenience of parties and will promote the just and efficient con-
duct of such actions.").
45 See Mike Roberts, Multidistrict Litigation and the Judicial Panel, Transfer and Tag-Along
Orders Prior to a Determination of Remand: Procedural and Substantive Problem or Effective
Judicial Policy?, 23 Memphis St U L Rev 841, 843 (1993) (explaining that defendants often
quickly initiate reference to the Judicial Panel in hopes of forcing plaintiffs to litigate the remand
question in a distant federal forum).
46 287 F3d 192 (DC Cir 2002).
47 Id at 194-95. The foreign states filed virtually identical complaints claiming fraud, negli-
gence, and unjust enrichment on the part of the tobacco companies, and seeking compensation
from the companies for the costs of treating those afflicted with tobacco-related illnesses.
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District Court for the Southern District of Florida.8 According to the
tobacco companies, removal was proper because there was federal
subject matter jurisdiction, premised on the federal common law of
foreign relations: The plaintiffs were foreign sovereigns whose vital
and material interests were at stake in the lawsuits. '9 At the same time,
the tobacco companies successfully moved to have the cases consoli-
dated by the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation and transferred
to the D.C. district court.'O The D.C. district court, however, rejected
the tobacco companies' jurisdictional argument, and remanded four of
the cases directly to the Florida state court." The defendants appealed
and the D.C. Circuit declined to hear the case, claiming that Section
1447(d) barred it from exercising appellate jurisdiction."
The D.C. Circuit's refusal to hear the case may have been a direct
result of the defendants' presentation of the issue. The tobacco com-
panies only challenged the D.C. district court's remand order on sub-
stantive grounds,3 and never disputed the procedural propriety of the
D.C. district court's cross-jurisdictional remand. Had the tobacco
companies convinced the D.C. Circuit that cross-jurisdictional re-
mands are not statutorily authorized by Section 1447(c), the D.C. dis-
trict court would have been forced to retransfer the case to the Flor-
ida federal court for subsequent remand. That transfer order would
have been reviewable, and review should have extended to the issue
of whether federal subject matter jurisdiction may be premised on the
federal common law of foreign relations.-4
2. Bankruptcy.
The bankruptcy context has its own set of transfer provisions. Ti-
tle 28 USC § 1412, akin to the general transfer provision in Section
1404(a), permits a district court to transfer a case or proceeding under
the Bankruptcy Code to a district court for another district, provided
that a transfer is in the interest of justice or for the convenience of the
parties. Additionally, 28 USC § 157(b)(5) allows the district court in
which a bankruptcy case is pending to transfer to itself personal injury
tort and wrongful death claims.6
48 Id.
49 Id at 197.
50 Idat 195.
51 See id at 195-96.
52 Id at 196-97.
53 See id at 196.
54 See Part I.A.4.a.
55 28 USC § 1412 (2000).
56 28 USC § 157(b)(5) (2000). Note that the circuit courts are divided on whether the de-
nial of a Section 157(b)(5) transfer motion is appealable as a final order, as a collateral order, orby way of mandamus. Contrast In re Dow Corning Corp, 86 F3d 482, 487-88 (6th Cir 1996) (re-
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With these bankruptcy transfer statutes, as with the general trans-
fer statutes, cross-jurisdictional remand is an option if the transferee
court decides that it lacks jurisdiction over a removed case or claim.
However, in bankruptcy cases it need not be a jurisdictional determi-
nation that raises the prospect of cross-jurisdictional remand. Even if
it has jurisdiction to hear a case transferred to it by another court, the
transferee court may decide to abstain from hearing the matter,57 de-
pending on the law of the circuit.' This, too, opens the door to a cross-
jurisdictional remand, which allows the abstaining transferee court to
remand the case or claim directly to the state court from which it was
originally removed.
A recent bankruptcy case, In re Federal-Mogul Global, Inc,"
drives home the legal consequences that follow from judicial interpre-
tations of the remand statutes. Federal-Mogul began for the most part
in state courts across the country, when thousands of plaintiffs filed
suit against United States automobile manufacturers claiming injury
from brake pads lined with asbestos.6° One of the brake pad manufac-
turers, Federal-Mogul Global, declared bankruptcy in federal district
61
court in Delaware. The automakers then began removing the thou-
sands of claims against them to federal court as "related to" the Fed-
eral-Mogul bankruptcy,6' and thus within the bankruptcy jurisdiction
viewing as both a final and collateral order), with Federal-Mogul, 300 F3d 368,384 (3d Cir 2002)
(reviewing by mandamus). Courts have noted that "Congress intended to allow for immediate
appeal in bankruptcy cases of orders that 'finally dispose of discrete disputes in the larger case."'
In re Sonnax Industries, 907 F2d at 1283, quoting In re Saco Local Development Corp, 711 F2d at
444 (Breyer). The denial of a Section 157(b)(5) transfer motion "finally dispose[s] of [a] discrete
dispute[] within the larger case," and thus should be reviewed by a lesser standard than manda-
mus. For further discussion of this point, see Part I.A.4.b.
57 Federal district courts may abstain from hearing certain types of bankruptcy proceed-
ings, and, under certain circumstances, they must abstain. See 28 USC § 1334(c).
58 The circuits are split on whether abstention applies in removed cases. Contrast Security
Farms v International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 124 F3d 999, 1009-10 (9th Cir 1997) (holding
that abstention does not apply in removed cases), with Christo v Padgett, 223 F3d 1324, 1331-32
(11th Cir 2000) (allowing abstention in removed cases); In re Southmark Corp, 163 F3d 925,929
(5th Cir 1999) (same); and Robinson v Michigan Consolidated Gas Co, Inc, 918 F2d 579, 584 n 3
(6th Cir 1990) (same). For courts that hold abstention applicable to a removed bankruptcy claim,
a decision to abstain requires a subsequent remand of the claim to state court-by either the dis-
trict court to which the claim was transferred or the district court to which the claim was re-
moved. (These courts are the same with cross-jurisdictional removals under Section 157(b)(5).
See note 141.) Even courts that do not apply abstention to removed bankruptcy claims could still
remand the claims under Section 1452. See 28 USC § 1452 (permitting remand of removed bank-
ruptcy claims on any "equitable ground").
59 300 F3d 368 (3d Cir 2002).
60 See id at 372.
61 Id.
62 Id at 373. The automakers claimed that if they were found liable to consumers, they
would pursue contribution and/or indemnification claims against the debtor, Federal-Mogul.
Some circuits have held that these types of lawsuits against nondebtors, by raising the specter of
subsequent liability against the debtor, are "related to" the debtor's bankruptcy for purposes of
The University of Chicago Law Review
of the federal courts.6' Simultaneously, the automakers moved the
Delaware district court to transfer all of the claims against them,
whether in state or federal court, to itself under Section 157(b)(5)."
The Delaware district court provisionally granted the auto-
makers' transfer motion,6 but it ultimately found that the claims were
insufficiently "related to" the Federal-Mogul bankruptcy to support
federal jurisdiction. ' This meant that it had to return thousands of
claims to the hundreds of state courts from which they were re-
moved." The Delaware district court elected to cross-jurisdictionally
remand the claims, relying on the bankruptcy remand provision, Sec-
tion 1452(b).6
The automakers appealed and, unlike the defendants in Philip
Morris, challenged the district court's cross-jurisdictional remand on
procedural grounds. Although the Third Circuit held that Section
1452(b) permits cross-jurisdictional remand,'° the difficulties in its ap-
proach are discussed below in Part II.B. Had the Third Circuit instead
held that Section 1452(b) prohibits cross-jurisdictional remand, then
the Delaware district court's remand order should have been review-
able -and the car companies should have been able to challenge on
appeal the district court's finding that it lacked subject matter jurisdic-
tion over the removed claims."'
This would have had at least two significant consequences. First,
the Third Circuit would have been obliged to address the issue that
had confronted the district court: the precise scope of "related to"
bankruptcy jurisdiction.72 In addition, the tens of thousands of claims
at issue might have remained in federal court. Cases like Philip Morris
and Federal-Mogul illustrate why the issue of cross-jurisdictional re-
mands appears most likely to arise in contexts like multidistrict litiga-
tion and bankruptcy, where the efficiency gains are most pro-
nounced- and the consequences for reviewability most severe.
the Bankruptcy Code. See In re Dow Coming Corp, 86 F3d at 494; A.H. Robins Co, Inc v Pic-
cinin, 788 F2d 994 (4th Cir 1986).
63 See note 15 and accompanying text.
64 See Federal-Mogul, 300 F3d at 373.
65 See In re Federal-Mogul Global, Inc, 282 BR at 304-05 (discussing the grant of the
automakers' provisional transfer motion pursuant to Section 157(b)(5)).
66 Id at 317. It held as an alternate ground of decision that abstention in favor of state
court adjudication was appropriate. Id. See text accompanying notes 57-58.
67 See 28 USC § 1447(c) ("If at any time before final judgment it appears that the district
court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded.").
68 See In re Federal-Mogul Global, Inc, 282 BR at 316-17 (arguing that returning the
claims to the federal courts to which they were removed would be "a waste of judicial energy"
compared to cross-jurisdictionally remanding).
69 See Federal-Mogul, 300 F3d at 385-86.
70 Id at 386-87.
71 See Part I.A.4.a.
72 See note 62.
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II. WHY CROSS-JURISDICTIONAL REMANDS ARE A PROBLEM
Having examined how cross-jurisdictional remands can arise and
why they deserve more attention from both litigants and courts, this
Part explains why, under the statutes governing remand by federal
courts and Supreme Court jurisprudence, cross-jurisdictional remands
are troubling. It then surveys current practice in the federal courts,
and concludes that courts have generally ignored the problem posed
by cross-jurisdictional remands.
A. The Reconciliation Requirement of Things Remembered
It may be tempting to treat the questions surrounding the general
and bankruptcy remand provisions as simple ones. Whatever Con-
gress's reasons for drafting the two statutes differently, the general
remand provision simply does not mirror the bankruptcy remand pro-
vision. Section 1452(b) specifically allows only "[t]he court to which
[a] claim or cause of action is removed" to subsequently remand that
case or claim;" however, Section 1447 contains no such textual prohi-
bition. Thus, claims removed on the basis of federal bankruptcy
jurisdiction may not be remanded directly to the state courts from
whence they came, but cases removed on other bases may be cross-
jurisdictionally remanded pursuant to Section 1447(c). This argument
is strengthened by the mandatory nature of Section 1447(c), which
states that a case "shall be remanded" if "at any time before final
judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject matter juris-
diction."'74 Once a transferee district court decides that it lacks subject
matter jurisdiction, an immediate remand appears the only authorized
response. Whatever this approach's merits, addressed at greater length
in Part III, it seems foreclosed by current Supreme Court jurispru-
dence. In Things Remembered, Inc v Petrarca,75 Anthony Petrarca filed
suit in an Ohio state court against his lessee and a guarantor seeking
rent due on two commercial leases." Things Remembered, Inc. (TRI)
was the successor-in-interest on the guaranty.77 After the suit had been
filed, the lessee declared bankruptcy.8 TRI then removed the action
under both the general federal removal statute, 28 USC § 1441(a), and
the bankruptcy removal statute, 28 USC § 1452(a).79 The United States
District Court for the Northern District of Ohio ultimately concluded
73 28 USC § 1452(b).
74 28 USC § 1447(c) (emphasis added).
75 516 US 124 (1995).
76 Id at 125.
77 Id.
78 Id at 125-26.
79 Id at 126.
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that Petrarca's removal petition was untimely under both Sections
1441(a) and 1452(a) and remanded the case to state court.82 The legal
issue before the Supreme Court was which remand statute-Section
1447 or 1452-applied. Petrarca argued that because the proceeding
was a bankruptcy case removed pursuant to Section 1452(a) only the
remand power and appellate bar contained in Section 1452(b) applied.
According to Petrarca, the general remand provision of Section 1447
was trumped in the bankruptcy context by the more specific remand
provision of Section 1452. Section 1452(b) permits remand "on any
equitable ground," and bars appellate review of such remand orders."
Since the district court had remanded on the basis of a procedural de-
fect, and not an equitable ground, Petrarca claimed that Section
1452(b) did not bar review.
The Supreme Court rejected Petrarca's argument and held that
Section 1447(d) applies to all remand orders, regardless of the statutes
under which the suits were removed.2 According to Justice Thomas,
writing for a unanimous Court:
There is no express indication in § 1452 that Congress intended
that statute to be the exclusive provision governing removals and
remands in bankruptcy. Nor is there any reason to infer from
§ 1447(d) that Congress intended to exclude bankruptcy cases
from its coverage. The fact that § 1452 contains its own provision
governing certain types of remands in bankruptcy ... does not
change our conclusion. There is no reason §§ 1447(d) and 1452
cannot comfortably coexist in the bankruptcy context. We must,
therefore, give effect to both.-
Thus, the Court rebuffed the notion that Sections 1447 and 1452 are
mutually exclusive, with the latter governing bankruptcy remands and
the former governing all other remands. According to the Court, lower
courts must "give effect to both" provisions when remanding bank-
ruptcy cases or claims, at least where there is no reason that the provi-
sions "cannot comfortably coexist."2
The need to "give effect to both" remand statutes in the bank-
ruptcy context creates difficulties that extend well beyond the bank-
ruptcy setting. On the one hand, courts that generally allow cross-jurisdictional remands under Section 1447(c) must ignore the plain
text of Section 1452(b) when it comes to bankruptcy remands; other-
wise, the general provision allows in all cases what the specific provi-
80 Id at 126-27 & n 2.
81 28 USC § 1452(b).
82 See Things Remembered, 516 US at 128.
83 Id at 129.
84 Id.
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sion forbids in a subset of those cases. Of course, courts could recon-
cile the two provisions by reading Section 1447(c) to prohibit cross-
jurisdictional remands in all cases, but this is hardly a more inviting so-
lution. It forces courts to pretend that Section 1447(c) speaks where it
is silent; after all, unlike Section 1452(b), Section 1447(c) does not
specify which court must order the case remanded.
Consider a case like Federal-Mogul, in which bankruptcy claims
are removed, transferred, and then remanded for lack of subject mat-
ter jurisdiction. Looking only at the text of the two remand provisions,
Section 1447(c) requires-or, at least, permits-that the claims "be
remanded" directly to state court by the transferee federal court,
while the text of Section 1452(b) forbids such a remand. The difficulty
in reconciling the provisions belies Justice Thomas's contention that
Sections 1447(c) and 1452(b) are easily harmonized.
B. Judicial Interpretation of the Remand Provisions
The majority of courts-and apparently litigants-has assumed
that Section 1447(c) permits cross-jurisdictional remands, and thus the
reviewability of cross-jurisdictional remands under Section 1447(c)
remains largely an open question. However, the issue has received
fuller attention in the bankruptcy context. Courts are divided on
whether Section 1452(b) permits cross-jurisdictional remands, and
thus on whether appellate review of cross-jurisdictional remands un-
der Section 1452(b) is available. None of the courts, however, at-
tempted the difficult task of reading each remand statute in light of
the other, and thus what sparse analysis exists is unsatisfyingly incom-
plete.
1. General remand provision: Section 1447(c).
Several courts have permitted cross-jurisdictional remands under
Section 1447(c), " but none of the courts had occasion to consider the
propriety of such remands. For instance, in Bloom v Barry, 6 the Third
Circuit had to decide whether a case could be remanded to a state
court other than the one from which it was removed. The case in
Bloom had been removed from a Florida state court, and then trans-
ferred to a New Jersey federal court. The New Jersey federal court,
finding that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction, remanded the case to
a New Jersey state court.
85 See, for example, Philip Morris 287 F3d at 195-97; Abels v State Farm Fire & Casualty
Co, 770 F2d 26,33 & n 13 (3d Cir 1985); Bloom v Barry, 755 F2d 356,358 (3d Cir 1985).
86 755 F2d 356 (3d Cir 1985).
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The Third Circuit held the remand improper, because "'[r]emand'
means 'send back.' It does not mean 'send elsewhere.""', The court
went on to say-in a single sentence and without citing any author-
ity-that if the New Jersey district court concluded once again on re-
mand that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction, "an order remanding
the instant case to the Florida state court should be entered pursuant
to 28 USC § 1447(c). ''w However, the Bloom court was never called on
to decide whether cross-jurisdictional remands are authorized by Sec-
tion 1447(c).89
At most, the court in Bloom assumed that Section 1447(c) au-
thorizes cross-jurisdictional remands, because nothing in Section
1447(c) limits the scope of remand to state courts geographically lo-
cated within the state in which the district court sits. The handful of
other cases to order cross-jurisdictional remands rests on the same as-
sumption: None of the cases considers the source of the authority to
remand directly across jurisdictional lines, let alone locates the source
of the authority in Section 1447(c).9 The assumption running through
the cases would be more defensible in the face of Section 1447(c)'s
apparent silence, were it not for the need to reconcile the general and
bankruptcy remand provisions. A court that wishes to permit cross-jurisdictional remand under Section 1447(c) must then explain how, in
bankruptcy cases, Section 1447(c) permits what the text of Section
1452(b) seems to explicitly forbid.
Bloom is significant, however, because, in holding that proce-
durally unauthorized remand orders are subject to appellate review, it
represents a sensible extension of Thermtron. Whereas Thermtron al-
lows review of substantively unauthorized remand orders, Bloom al-
lows review of procedurally unauthorized remand orders.9' By analogy,
if Section 1447(c) does not permit cross-jurisdictional remands, such
remand orders are reviewable.
87 Idat358.
8 Id.
89 Id.
90 See, for example, Philip Morris, 287 F3d at 195-97 (leaving unconsidered the statutory
authority for cross-jurisdictional remands); Abels, 770 F2d at 33 & n 13 (same).
91 See, for example, In re Ford Motor Company/Citibank (South Dakota), N.A. Cardholder
Rebate Litigation, 264 F3d 952, 964-65 (9th Cir 2001) (asserting appellate jurisdiction over re-
mand order where defendant claimed that district court had exceeded its statutory authority in
purporting to remand a dismissed action), cert granted as Ford Motor Co v McCauley, 534 US
1126 (2002), cert dismissed as improvidently granted, 123 S Ct 584 (2002).
92 For further discussion of why procedurally unauthorized remand orders should be re-
viewable, see Part I.A.4.a.
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2. Bankruptcy remand provision: Section 1452(b).
Section 1452(b), of course, authorizes remand by "[t]he court to
which such claim or cause of action is removed,"" rather than by any
subsequent district court to which the claim or cause of action is trans-
ferred. ' Despite the statutory text, some lower federal courts have
permitted cross-jurisdictional remand in bankruptcy cases without any
analysis of Section 1452(b).95 Only a few federal appellate courts have
considered the textual question and they are divided on the question
of whether 1452(b) permits cross-jurisdictional remands. The Ninth
Circuit has held that Section 1452(b) does not permit cross-
jurisdictional remand, while the Third Circuit has held that it does. 9
a) Textual approach. In In re US. Refining & Marketing Co,
Inc, the Ninth Circuit considered whether the text of 1452(b) author-
izes a California federal court to cross-jurisdictionally remand a case
to the Texas state court in which the case had originated. It decided
that the cross-jurisdictional remand order was not authorized by Sec-
tion 1452(b), since the California federal court was not the "court to
which [the] claim or cause of action [was] removed." While the Ninth
Circuit commended the lower court's efforts "to conserve valuable j u-
dicial resources" by sending the action directly back to the Texas state
court, it found this procedural shortcut at odds with the statutory
text.9 Rather than remand the action directly, the California federal
court should have retransferred the action to the federal district court
in Texas, which could have then remanded to state court. This "seria-
tim approach" of retransfer and remand, while arguably less efficient
than cross-jurisdictional remand, is "the procedure mandated by Con-
gress."'' "
93 28 USC § 1452(b).
94 See text accompanying note 25.
95 See, for example, In re Best Reception Systems, Inc, 219 BR 988, 990 (Bankr ED Tenn
1998) (declining to stay remand of cases from Tennessee bankruptcy court to Alabama and
Georgia state courts in which they had originated); In re Missouri Properties, Ltd, 211 BR 914,
928 (Bankr WD Mo 1996) (remanding case from Missouri bankruptcy court to Texas state court
in which it had originated); In re Danbury Square Associates, Ltd Partnership, 150 BR 544, 547-
49 (Bankr SD NY 1993) (remanding case from New York bankruptcy court to Connecticut state
court in which it had originated).
96 Compare In re US. Refining & Marketing Co, Inc, 2000 US App LEXIS 219, *2 (9th Cir
2000) (unpublished) (barring cross-jurisdictional remand pursuant to Section 1452(b)), with Al-
lied Signal Recovery Trust v Allied Signal Inc, 298 F3d 263, 271 (3d Cir 2002) (allowing cross-
jurisdictional remand pursuant to Section 1452(b)); Federal-Mogul, 300 F3d at 386-87 (same).
Under Ninth Circuit rules, unpublished opinions are not binding precedent; however, this does
not diminish the persuasiveness of the Ninth Circuit's textual analysis. See Ninth Circuit Rule 36-
3(a), online at http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov (visited Mar 17,2003).
97 2000 US App LEXIS 219, *2 (9th Cir 2000) (unpublished).
98 Id at *2-3 (quoting Section 1452(b)).
99 Idat*3.
100 Id.
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b) Inherent powers approach. At least one lower court has
recognized, though it ultimately rejected, the Ninth Circuit's textualist
approach. In In re Federal-Mogul Global, Inc,' the Delaware district
court acknowledged that Section 1452(b) on its face appears to pre-
clude cross-jurisdictional remand, but declared that "it is not clear
what interest would be served" by heeding this statutory limitation
and retransferring the claims to the federal courts to which they were
removed. The court characterized the issue as "really just [a ques-
tion] of inter-jurisdictional bookkeeping";'. and it claimed that its "in-
herent powers, those 'necessary to the exercise of all others,' re-
solve[d] any lingering questions" about its authority to order a direct
cross-jurisdictional remand of the thousands of claims at issue in the
104
case.
The Delaware district court failed, however, to see the broader
implications of its holding: At issue were both the district court's au-
thority to order a cross-jurisdictional remand and the appellate court's
authority to review that order. If the claims had been retransferred to
the federal courts to which they had been removed, those courts, in
turn, would have been bound by the Delaware district court's jurisdic-
tional determination under law of the case principles.'' Nevertheless,
the retransfer order, unlike a remand order, would not have been sub-
ject to Section 1447(d)'s bar on appellate review, and would have been
reviewable.
The district court in Federal-Mogul also failed to explain why the
power to order a cross-jurisdictional remand is among the "inherent
powers" of courts, or those powers "necessary to the exercise of all
others.'. Whatever powers inhere in courts, these powers are not a li-
cense to disregard statutory limitations, ° and it is unclear why a cross-
jurisdictional remand-as opposed to a transfer-is truly "necessary
101 282 BR 301 (Bankr D Del 2002).
102 Id at 317.
103 Id at 316.
104 Id at 317 (citations omitted).
105 The district court's determination that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction would not
have been so clearly erroneous as to merit reconsideration by other district courts. See, for ex-
ample, Christianson v Colt Industries Operating Corp, 486 US 800,815-17 (1988) (requiring clear
error for a coordinate court to disregard the doctrine of the law of the case); Hayman Cash Reg-
ister Co v Sarokin, 669 F2d 162, 164-70 (3d Cir 1982) (requiring the transferee court, in the ab-
sence of unusual circumstances, to accept as the law of the case the transferor court's determina-
tions regarding personal jurisdiction and venue).
106 In re Federal-Mogul Global, Inc, 282 BR at 317.
107 See, for example, Bank of Nova Scotia v United States, 487 US 250,254 (1988) (calling it
"well established" that even a "sensible and efficient use of [a federal court's] supervisory
power" is invalid if in conflict with constitutional or statutory restrictions) (quotation omitted).
Consider Carlisle v United States, 517 US 416,425-28 (1998) (holding that, whatever courts' "in-
herent powers" are, they do not include the power to circumvent or conflict with the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure).
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to the exercise of all other[]" powers.'O' Regardless, to the extent that
district courts rely on inherent powers to order cross-jurisdictional
remand, their authority is not derived from Section 1447(c) or
1452(b), and thus their orders are not subject to the bars on appellate
review in Sections 1447(d) and 1452(b).' "
Interestingly, the Third Circuit held on appeal in Federal-Mogul
that the Delaware district court's cross-jurisdictional remand order
was authorized by Section 1452(b) and therefore was insulated from
appellate review." However, the appellate court addressed neither the
district court's argument that the route of remand is nothing more
than a question of bookkeeping, nor its argument that cross-
jurisdictional remand is among courts' inherent powers. Rather, the
Third Circuit based its decision on two of its own prior precedents,
Abels v State Farm Fire & Casualty Company." and Bloom," and the
D.C. Circuit's recent opinion in Philip Morris."' Yet none of these
cases questions the propriety of cross-jurisdictional remands. Thus,
none of these cases effectively answers the Ninth Circuit's argument
that the language in Section 1452(b) does not authorize cross-
jurisdictional remand. Moreover, Abels, Bloom, and Philip Morris all
involve remands pursuant to Section 1447 rather than Section 1452.,4
Because these cases did not involve the remand of bankruptcy claims,
there was no need to address Section 1452(b)'s textual proscription
against cross-jurisdictional remand. In short, Federal-Mogul, rather
than offering any real response to the Ninth Circuit's straightforward
textual analysis in U.S. Refining, elided the very issue it was supposed
to resolve.
108 See, for example, In re Prudential Insurance Co America Sales Practices Litigation Agent
Actions, 278 F3d 175, 188-89 (3d Cir 2002) (allowing that one of a court's inherent powers is to
sanction attorneys who appear before it).
109 This is made explicit in Section 1452(b), where the bar on appellate review applies solely
to remand orders entered pursuant to Section 1452(b) itself. See 28 USC § 1452(b) ("The court
to which such claim or cause of action is removed may remand such claim or cause of action on
any equitable ground. An order entered under this subsection remanding a claim or cause of ac-
tion ... is not reviewable by appeal or otherwise .. ") (emphasis added). By contrast, Section
1447(d) bars appellate review of "[a]n order remanding a case," without stating that the order
must be entered pursuant to Section 1447(c). However, Thermtron read Section 1447(d) as if it
contained such language. See Part I.A.4.a.
110 Federal-Mogul, 300 F3d at 386-87.
111 770 F2d 26 (3d Cir 1985).
112 755 F2d 356.
113 287 F3d 192.
114 See Philip Morris, 287 F3d at 195-96 (leaving unconsidered the statutory authority for
cross-jurisdictional remands under Section 1447); Abels, 770 F2d at 33 & n 13 (same); Bloom, 755
F2d at 358 (same). The Third Circuit cited to the same cases in its decision in Allied Signal, which
similarly held that Section 1452(b) permits cross-jurisdictional remand. See 298 F3d at 270-71.
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c) Inherited powers approach. Federal-Mogul was one of a pair
of recent cases-Allied Signal Recovery Trust v Allied Signal Inc.' is
the other-in which the Third Circuit upheld cross-jurisdictional re-
mands of bankruptcy claims. In Allied Signal, the Third Circuit pro-
vided a different rationale for permitting cross-jurisdictional remand
under Section 1452(b), namely, the general principle that "a transferee
court is deemed to inherit all of the authority of a transferor court..''.
According to the Allied Signal court, because the transferor court may
remand a case to the state court from which it was removed, so may
the transferee court. The authority to remand cases or claims cross-
jurisdictionally derives not from Section 1452(b), but from the com-
mon law principle that a transferee court stands in the shoes of a
transferor court with respect to a transferred case.
However, the court did not explain how a transferee court could
be "deemed" to inherit the authority to order cross-jurisdictional re-
mands given the text of Section 1452(b). Generally speaking, it may be
true that a transferee court stands in the shoes of a transferor court
with respect to a transferred case, but that general principle is super-
seded by the plain language of a statute-like Section 1452(b)-that
expressly limits the particular power of a particular court."'
Indeed, the Third Circuit effectively rewrote the statute by excis-
ing the words "to which such claim or cause of action is removed"
from Section 1452(b). After all, the only courts in a position to remand
the claims are the removal court and any transferee court. The Allied
Signal court's interpretation thus ignores the rule that statutes are to
be construed, if possible, to give every word operative effect. "
Whether the Third Circuit and its lower courts are correct that Section
1452(b) ought not limit the power of district courts to remand cases
directly to state court, "the proper venue for resolving that issue re-
mains the floor of Congress. '"9
115 298 F3d 263,271 (3d Cir 2002).
116 Allied Signal, 298 F3d at 271. The court cited in support the Tenth Circuit's decision in
Chrysler Credit Corp v Country Chrysler, Inc, 928 F2d 1509, 1516 (10th Cir 1991). According to
the court in Chrysler Credit, "[t]he transferee court's powers are coextensive with those of the
transferor court; it may issue any order or render any judgment that could have been made in
the transferor court had the transfer never taken place." Id.
117 See, for example, Lexecon Inc v Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 523 US 26, 43
(1998) (prohibiting considerations of efficiency and economy from trumping the text of a juris-
dictional statute); Badaracco v Commissioner, 464 US 386, 398 (1984) ("Courts are not author-
ized to rewrite a statute because they might deem its effects susceptible of improvement.").
118 See, for example, Duncan v Walker, 533 US 167, 174 (2001) (positing courts' duty to
avoid treating statutory terms as surplusage); United States v Nordic Village, Inc, 503 US 30, 36
(1992) (same); Moskal v United States, 498 US 103, 109-10 (1990) (same).
119 Lexecon, 523 US at 40.
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III. RECONCILING THE REMAND STATUTES
Recent cases like Federal-Mogul and Allied Signal make it clear
that district courts are uncertain about how to interpret the remand
provisions, and that appellate courts are providing little guidance. This
Part offers an interpretation that makes sense of the statutes and
would prove simple for judges to administer. It first considers the
various ways in which courts could justify permitting or prohibiting
cross-jurisdictional remands, given the text of the statutes and Su-
preme Court case law. It then argues that these sources are best un-
derstood as prohibiting cross-jurisdictional remands. Finally, it answers
potential objections to that view.
A. Permitting Cross-Jurisdictional Remands
Cross-jurisdictional remands may be premised on either the gen-
eral remand provision contained in Section 1447(c), or the bankruptcy
removal provision of 1452(a). To cross-jurisdictionally remand under
the general remand provision, courts must avoid Things Remem-
bered's requirement that the statutes be reconciled. To allow cross-
jurisdictional remands under Section 1452(b), courts must ignore the
provision's text. Neither of these options is ultimately satisfying.
1. Interpreting Section 1447(c) to allow cross-jurisdictional
remands.
A court that wishes to allow cross-jurisdictional remands under
Section 1447(c) must first distinguish Things Remembered. In Things
Remembered, the Supreme Court held that Section 1447(d) applies to
all remand orders, regardless of whether the case or claim was re-
moved under the general removal statute, Section 1441, or the bank-
ruptcy removal statute, Section 1452(a).'2 Strictly speaking, Things
Remembered requires only that Section 1447(d) -and not Section
1447(c)- apply in the bankruptcy context. Yet the reason for the
Court's decision was that neither remand statute indicates that it is
exclusive of the other. The Court's reasoning applies with equal force
to Section 1447(c): There is no more reason to infer from Section
1447(c) than from Section 1447(d) "that Congress intended to exclude
bankruptcy cases from its coverage.' 2' And, certainly, there remains
"no express indication in [Section] 1452 that Congress intended that
statute to be the exclusive provision governing removals and remancds
in bankruptcy."'2
120 See Things Remembered, 516 US at 128.
121 Id at 129.
122 Id.
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One way to distinguish Things Remembered is to claim that there
is a reason that Sections 1447(c) and 1452 cannot comfortably coexist
in the bankruptcy context: the latter contains a textual proscription
against cross-jurisdictional remands not present in the former. On this
view, Things Remembered's reconciliation requirement applies only
when reconciliation is possible, and it is impossible in the context of
cross-jurisdictional remand. This assumes, however, that Section
1447(c) must be read to allow cross-jurisdictional remand. In fact, Sec-
tion 1447(c) need not be-and, for reasons discussed below, is not
best-read that way.23
It is not simply possible to reconcile Section 1447(c) with the
bankruptcy remand provision, but it is easier than the reconciliation of
Section 1447(d) that the Supreme Court required in Things Remem-
bered. If Section 1447(d) can and must "comfortably coexist" with Sec-
tion 1452(b), then so must Section 1447(c).1 14 For instance, Section
1447(d) bars review of remand orders by "appeal or otherwise," with a
single substantive exception for certain types of civil rights cases."'
However, Section 1452(b) bars review of bankruptcy remands "by ap-
peal or otherwise by the courts of appeals under section 158(d), 1291,
or 1292 of [Title 28] or by the Supreme Court of the United States un-
der section 1254 of [Title 28] ....26 In other words, Section 1452(b) enu-
merates the provisions under which review is precluded, and it omits
any mention of the All Writs Act, ' which authorizes issuance of writs
of mandamus. Thus, it is unclear whether the bar on appellate review
in Section 1452(b) precludes review of bankruptcy remands by way of
mandamus: ' * The text of Section 1452(b) does not appear to bar man-
damus review, while the text of Section 1447(d) appears to sweep in all
forms of review, including mandamus. The relevant point is that Sec-
tion 1447(c) is no harder to reconcile with the bankruptcy remand
provision than Section 1447(d); indeed, it is easier, since the text of
1447(c) is not in direct conflict with the text of the bankruptcy remand
provision.
Of course, rather than distinguish Things Remembered, a court
that wishes to allow cross-jurisdictional remand in non-bankruptcy
cases might rely on the general principle, articulated in Allied Signal,
123 See Part III.B.
124 Things Remembered, 516 US at 129.
125 28 USC § 1447(d).
126 28 USC § 1452(b).
127 28 USC § 1651 (2000).
128 Contrast In re Dow Corning Corp, 113 F3d 565,569 (6th Cir 1997) (permitting review by
way of mandamus based on the identical language of 28 USC § 1334(d)), with In re Federal-
Mogul Global, Inc, 300 F3d 368,389 (3d Cir 2002) (precluding review of bankruptcy remand or-
ders by way of mandamus); Matter of US Brass Corp, 110 F3d 1261, 1266 (7th Cir 1997) (noting
that Section 1452(b)'s bar on appellate review "seem[s] to take in mandamus").
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that "a transferee court is deemed to inherit all the authority of a
transferor court."' If the federal court to which a case is removed may
remand the case to state court, then so may any subsequent federal
court to which the case is transferred."' There are two versions of this
argument, neither of which is persuasive.
On the one hand, if federal courts derive their general remand
powers from Section 1447(c), then the argument is just another way of
asking whether Section 1447(c) permits cross-jurisdictional remand. If
Section 1447(c) does not grant to federal courts the power to remand
a case cross-jurisdictionally, then that power cannot be inherited by a
transferee court-and the transferor court's power to remand directly
cannot be converted into a power to remand cross-jurisdictionally
simply because the case is transferred.
On the other hand, the claim might be that courts have some in-
herent, extra-statutory remand powers quite apart from Section
1447(c). This would allow courts to order cross-jurisdictional remands
in bankruptcy cases and still remain faithful to Things Remembered:
While 1447(c) could be interpreted to prohibit cross-jurisdictional re-
mands, such remands would constitute an exercise of courts' inherent
powers. What this would not allow courts to do, however, is to insulate
cross-jurisdictional remand orders from appellate review. To the ex-
tent that district courts rely on inherent powers to order cross-
jurisdictional remand, their authority is not derived from Section
1447(c) or 1452(b), and thus their orders are not subject to the bars on
appellate review in Sections 1447(d) and 1452(b)."'
2. Interpreting Section 1452(b) to allow cross-jurisdictional
remands.
As the Ninth Circuit held in US. Refining, Section 1452(b) au-
thorizes remand by "[t]he court to which such claim or cause of action
is removed,' 3 and not by any subsequent district court to which the
claim or cause of action is transferred. Perhaps, though, this is too
slender a reed on which to rest one's argument. There is no special
reason why Congress would prohibit cross-jurisdictional remands in
the bankruptcy context. Rather than bringing Section 1447(c) into
harmony with Section 1452(b) by prohibiting cross-jurisdictional re-
129 Allied Signal, 298 F3d at 271.
130 Note that the Third Circuit made just such an argument in the context of Section
1452(b) in Allied Signal, and permitted a common law principle to trump the clear text of the
bankruptcy remand provision. See Part II.B.2. However, applying the principle to a general re-
mand would not do violence to the text of Section 1447(d).
131 See text accompanying note 109 (explaining why cross-jurisdictional remand orders
based on courts' inherent powers are not barred from appellate review).
132 28 USC § 1452(b).
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mands across the board, courts could loosen the textual prohibition in
Section 1452(b).
The judicial creation of exceptions to statutory text is not without
precedent in the interpretation of jurisdictional statutes. Although
Section 1447(c) states that a case "shall be remanded" if it lacks fed-
eral jurisdiction, some courts have developed the so-called "futility
exception" to permit dismissal rather than remand.'33 The exception
"allows a district court to dismiss an action rather than remand it to
the state court when remand would be futile because the state court
also would lack jurisdiction over the matter.""'
In like fashion, courts could allow cross-jurisdictional remand
rather than retransfer when retransfer would mean only an eventual
remand anyway. However, such exceptions do not affect only the func-
tioning of the judicial system, as courts have claimed. 5 They also af-
fect the substantive rights of litigants -who are deprived of the oppor-
tunity to present state law claims to a state court, in the case of the fu-
tility exception, or who are faced with an unreviewable remand order
rather than a reviewable retransfer order, in the case of cross-
jurisdictional remand. Whatever the merits of these judicially engi-
neered exceptions to statutory text, those debates are properly left to
Congress instead of the courts.'36
B. Prohibiting Cross-Jurisdictional Remands
The determination that Section 1447(c) does not allow for cross-
jurisdictional remand has a number of advantages: In addition to
reconciling the remand statutes as required by Things Remembered, it
comports with the text of the statutes and prevents undue judicial dis-
cretion.
133 Compare Bell v City of Kellogg, 922 F2d 1418, 1424-25 (9th Cir 1991) (applying the futil-
ity exception in upholding the district court's dismissal of a removed case);Asarco, Inc v Glenara,
Ltd, 912 F2d 784,787 (5th Cir 1990) (same), with Bromwell v Michigan Mutual Insurance Co, 115
F3d 208,213 (3d Cir 1997) (rejecting the futility exception based on the plain meaning of Section
1447(c)); Roach v West Virginia Regional Jail and Correctional Facility Authority, 74 F3d 46, 49
(4th Cir 1996) (same); Smith v Wisconsin Department ofAgriculture, Trade and Consumer Protec-
tion, 23 F3d 1134, 1139 (7th Cir 1994) (same). It should be noted that the Supreme Court in In-
ternational Primate Protection League v Administrators of Tulane Educational Fund, 500 US 72,
87-89 (1991), came close to rejecting the futility exception.
134 Bromwell, 115 F3d at 213.
135 See, for example, Bell, 922 F2d at 1424-25 ("We do not believe Congress intended to ig-
nore the interest of efficient use of judicial resources."); In re Federal-Mogul Global, Inc, 282 BR
301, 317 (Bankr D Del 2002) ("The logic of the statutory structure suggests that [the two-step
transfer and remand procedure], with its attendant waste of judicial energy, is unnecessary.").
136 See, for example, Lexecon Inc v Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 523 US 26, 40
(1998).
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1. Making sense of the corpus juris.
Since the remand provisions must be harmonized under Things
Remembered, courts face a simple choice: read Section 1447(c)'s am-
biguous text as precluding what it does not clearly permit, or read Sec-
tion 1452(b)'s text as permitting what it quite clearly precludes.
Choosing the former is preferable for a number of reasons. Not only
does it avoid doing violence to the text of Section 1452(b), but, as dis-
cussed below, it comports with the text of Section 1447(c) and thus
"make[s] sense rather than nonsense out of the corpus juris" as a
whole."' It also creates an easily administrable system for judges, liti-
gants and clerks of the courts, because cases are returned from federal
to state court along the same route by which they came. In essence,
this is a simple solution to a straightforward problem: If courts must
"give effect to both" remand provisions in bankruptcy cases, despite
their differences, then courts should read the ambiguous general re-
mand provision in light of the unambiguous bankruptcy remand pro-
vision. At the least, courts should not ignore the text of the bankruptcy
remand provision; even if the general remand statute authorizes cross-jurisdictional remand, courts still have erred in permitting cross-
jurisdictional remand in bankruptcy cases.
In fact, there is no evidence that Section 1447(c) contemplates
cross-jurisdictional remands. Section 1447(c) states that if "the district
court" lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case must be remanded.'3
137 West Virginia University Hospital4 Inc v Casey, 499 US 83, 101 (1991) (explaining that
the Court's role when faced with ambiguous statutory terms is to construe those terms as consis-
tent with the body of law).
138 28 USC § 1447(c). As codified in the 1948 revisions to Title 28, Section 1447(c) read as
follows: "If at any time before final judgment it appears that the case was removed improvi-
dently and without jurisdiction, the district court shall remand the case, and may order the pay-
ment of just costs." 28 USC § 1447(c) (1976 & Supp 1987). The straightforward interpretation of
this pre-1988 version of Section 1447(c) is that Congress foresaw remand by "the district court"
to which the case had been removed.
In 1988, Congress amended Section 1447(c) to read:
A motion to remand the case on the basis of any defect in removal procedure must be
made within 30 days after the filing of the notice of removal under § 1446(a). If at any time
before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the
case shall be remanded....
See Act of November 19, 1988, Pub L No 100-702, Title X, § 1016(c), 102 Stat 4642,4670. The new
language changed the wording of the grounds for removal and placed a thirty-day time limit on
filing a motion to remand based on a procedural defect. There is no evidence, either from the
new language or the legislative history surrounding its enactment, that Congress intended to ad-
dress the practice of cross-jurisdictional remand. See Hrdlick, 82 Marq L Rev at 562 (cited in
note 33) (showing that the time limit was merely procedural).
In 1996, Congress amended the statute yet again to read: "A motion to remand the case on
the basis of any defect other than lack of subject matter jurisdiction must be made within 30 days
after the filing of the notice of removal under § 1446(a). If at any time before final judgment it
appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded." See
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This same phrase, "the district court," appears in a number of other
provisions dealing with removal and remand. For instance, both the
general removal statute, 28 USC § 1441(a), and the bankruptcy re-
moval statute, 28 USC § 1452(a), authorize removal only to "the dis-
trict court" for the district where the state action is pending. "9 More-
over, Section 1447(a) states that "[iun any case removed from a State
court, the district court may issue all necessary orders and process to
bring before it all proper parties,' ° which apparently means "the dis-
trict court" to which the case is removed. In a case that was removed
and then transferred, Section 1447(a) presumably would not bar the
transferee district court from bringing before it all proper parties.
Nevertheless, these statutes all appear to contemplate a symmetrical
scheme in which remand mirrors removal. Proceedings move back
and forth between the state and federal judiciaries on an established
path between a state court and the federal district court for the district
and division embracing that state court.
These textual clues are not so much evidence that Congress in-
tended to prohibit cross-jurisdictional remand, as that Congress sim-
ply did not consider transfer when drafting the removal and remand
provisions. Rather, Congress conceived of removal and remand as
mirroring each other; together they shuttle cases between state and
federal courts in the same federal district. Once in federal court, if an
action belongs in another district, it can be transferred, and if it does
not belong in that district after all, it can be transferred back."'
Whether or not these textual clues would be strong enough to militate
against cross-jurisdictional remand under Section 1447(c) in the ab-
sence of Things Remembered, reading the remand statutes to prohibit
cross-jurisdictional remand is entirely consistent with their text.
Act of October 1, 1996, Pub L No 104-219, § 1,110 Stat 3022. Again, nothing in the new language
or its legislative history speaks to remand by a federal court other than that to which a case is
removed. See Clarification of Rules for Removal of Cases to Federal Court, HR Rep No 104-
799, 104th Cong, 2d Sess 2 (1996) (explaining that the purpose of the law is to clarify that the
thirty-day limit does not apply to cases where the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction).
139 28 USC § 1441(a); 28 USC § 1452(a).
140 28 USC § 1447(a).
141 One exception might be Section 157(b)(5), which has been interpreted to permit cross-
jurisdictional removal: A district court may transfer to itself personal injury and wrongful death
claims directly from state courts in other districts (as well as its own). See In re Pan Am Corp, 16
F3d 513, 516 (2d Cir 1994) (permitting federal court in the Southern District of New York to
transfer personal injury cases from Florida state court to itself). However, this interpretation is
open to question. Section 157(b)(5) does not purport to be a jurisdictional grant to bankruptcy
or district courts (as do other provisions in Section 157); it merely authorizes the district court in
which the bankruptcy is pending to fix venue as between one of two federal courts. Section
157(b)(5) could be read to permit federal courts to fix venue for such claims, once the claims
have been removed from state court under Section 1452(a).
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2. Judicial administration.
In addition to making sense of the statutes, this view has at least
one practical advantage over current practice: It prevents judges from
insulating their decisions from appellate review. Consider the district
court in Federal-Mogul. It was interpreting a widely influential deci-
sion ' of the Third Circuit regarding the scope of "related to" bank-
ruptcy jurisdiction' 3-an unsettled issue among the circuit courts."
Having decided that the thousands of claims lacked federal subject
matter jurisdiction, rather than remanding the claims directly, the dis-
trict court could have chosen to retransfer the claims for remand. The
latter choice would have been reviewable; the remand order, at least
according to the Third Circuit, was not." By interpreting the statutes
to allow district courts the choice between retransfer and cross-jurisdictional remand, district courts can determine the availability of
appellate review. The closest analogy is certification for interlocutory
review, but a district court's refusal to certify a question for interlocu-
tory review only delays, but does not prevent, eventual appellate re-
view. Of course, if district court judges should not enjoy the option of
insulating their decisions from review, this only means that the current
regime should be replaced by a more rule-bound approach; the rule
could be either that district judges must retransfer cases or that they
must cross-jurisdictionally remand them. The need to reconcile the
remand statutes cuts in favor of the former over the latter, as does the
potential inefficiency of cross-jurisdictional remand.'
C. Potential Objections
The interpretation of the remand statutes proposed by this
Comment holds that courts should not ignore the text of Section
1452(b), which prohibits remand by any federal court other than the
one to which a case or claim is removed. The requirement that Sec-
tions 1447 and 1452 be reconciled thus dictates that Section 1447 be
142 See Pacor, Inc v Higgins, 743 F2d 984 (3d Cir 1984). See also Celotex Corp v Edwards,
514 US 300,308 & n 6 (1995) (citing Pacor favorably and discussing its influence).
143 See Federal-Mogul Global, Inc, 282 BR at 305-13 (excluding from the scope of "related
to" bankruptcy jurisdiction mass-tort claims against nondebtors that could have resulted in even-
tual liability for the debtor).
144 Compare In re Dow Corning Corp, 86 F3d 482, 494 (6th Cir 1996) (finding "related to"jurisdiction on the basis of the possibility of the debtor's contribution or indemnification liabil-
ity), with Arnold v Garlock, Inc, 278 F3d 426, 440-41 (5th Cir 2001) (denying motion to stay
pending appeal partially due to weakness of the defendant's theory of "related to" jurisdiction
based on contribution liability).
145 See Federal-Mogul, 300 F3d at 386-87.
146 See 28 USC § 1292(b) (2000).
147 See Part III.C.3.
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read to prohibit cross-jurisdictional remand, which is entirely consis-
tent with its text.
There are at least three possible objections to the view that the
remand statutes are best understood as prohibiting cross-jurisdictional
remand. The first two objections, one textual and the other purposive,
involve opposing jurisdictional determinations in the same case by dif-
ferent federal courts, while the third objection concerns the alleged
inefficiency of cross-jurisdictional remand.
1. Textual objection.
There is a textual objection to retransferring rather than cross-
jurisdictionally remanding cases: Section 1447(c) says that a case
"shall be remanded" if at any time before final judgment the district
court believes that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction.'4' The stronger
version of this objection would be that Section 1447(c) requires an
immediate remand rather than a retransfer: A court must cross-
jurisdictionally remand a case that has been removed and transferred.
For reasons already discussed, this objection need not carry the day.
"[T]he district court" can be read to mean only the courts to which
cases are removed, and this reading is supported by the text of the
various statutes.' '
The weaker version of the objection, though, is concerned not
with the timing of the remand, but with its eventuality. For instance,
suppose that in Federal-Mogul one of the claims had been removed
from Illinois state court. The Delaware district court now opts to re-
transfer the claim to Illinois federal court for remand. What prevents
the Illinois federal court from reconsidering the Delaware district
court's jurisdictional ruling?'" This could cycle the claim between fed-
eral courts and would mean that the case has not been remanded as
Section 1447(c) demands.5 '
The straightforward answer to this objection is that, even if the
law of the case doctrine does not bar reconsideration of the jurisdic-
tional determination, Section 1447(c) does when it states that the case
148 28 USC § 1447(c).
149 See Part III.B.1.
150 The Supreme Court has counseled that, under the law of the case doctrine, such recon-
sideration should be reserved for situations of clear error, see Christianson v Colt Industries Op-
erating Corp, 486 US 800, 819 (1988), but this is precisely the problem. The Illinois federal court
is only likely to reconsider jurisdiction if it intends to reverse the Delaware district court and
keep the case (or transfer it elsewhere in the federal system).
151 Another example is transfer by the Delaware district court to a federal district court in
the Sixth Circuit. Were the latter court able to reexamine the jurisdictional question, its inquiry
would be controlled by the Sixth Circuit's decision in In re Dow Corning Corp, 86 F3d 482,494
(6th Cir 1996), which upheld federal jurisdiction in similar circumstances.
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"shall be remanded"; '52 the statute trumps the common law doctrine of
law of the case. When the Delaware district court sends back the claim
for lack of jurisdiction, Section 1447(c) commands the Illinois district
court to remand the claim. The transfer order remains reviewable, and
the case is remanded as Section 1447(c) demands. This may seem to
beg the question: How can Section 1447(c) require only the Illinois,
and not the Delaware, district court to remand? Yet the Delaware dis-
trict court, since it lacks the power to remand cross-jurisdictionally, ef-
fects remand by funneling the claim through the Illinois court, which
is foreclosed by Section 1447(c) from reexamining subject matter ju-
risdiction.
2. Purposive objection.
There is an another argument in favor of cross-jurisdictional re-
mand over retransfer that rests not on statutory text, but rather on
congressional purpose. The purpose of immunizing remand orders
from appellate review is "to prevent delay in the trial of remanded
cases by protracted litigation of jurisdictional issues.'". In this sense, a
cross-jurisdictional remand is just a decision by the transferee court
that the case does not belong in federal court. As such, it is no differ-
ent from a remand decision in a case that is only removed (and not
transferred), which would be barred from review by Section 1447(d).
It seems odd that litigants could secure review simply by transferring
cases between federal courts prior to any remand.
However, there is an important wrinkle in a case that is removed
and transferred, namely, the prospect that two (or more) federal
courts have made jurisdictional determinations in the case. This differs
from the situation contemplated by the remand provisions, in which
the federal court to which a case is removed is the same court that
makes the jurisdictional determinations and orders any remand.",
The spectre of multiple-and potentially conflicting-judgments
on the federal level should give us pause. On the one hand, a number
of cases hold that if federal subject matter jurisdiction is questionable,
the case should be remanded to state court; for if the case continued
to judgment in federal court, only to have it determined on appeal
that jurisdiction was lacking, judicial resources would be wasted on a
151retrial in state court. On the other hand, the unreviewability of re-
mand orders militates against a pro-remand presumption, because the
152 28 USC § 1447(c).
153 Thermtron,423 US at 351.
154 See Part III.B.1.
155 See Wright, Miller, and Cooper, 14C Federal Practice and Procedure: Jurisdiction § 3739
at 446-50 (cited in note 16).
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parties may have lost a federal forum to which they are statutorily en-
titled."'
Whatever the trade-off between these conflicting urges, the ob-
jection that cross-jurisdictional remand comports with congressional
purpose rests on the view that Congress has already made the trade-
off in the remand statutes. However, there is no reason to assume this.
One statute is best read as prohibiting the practice of cross-
jurisdictional remand, and the other quite explicitly forbids it. Con-
gress clearly felt that appellate review of garden-variety remand or-
ders was unnecessary, but the purposive objection extends Congress's
conviction, assuming in effect that Congress would have reached the
same view had it only considered cases that have been removed and
then transferred. Yet imagine a removed case in which the transferor
court decides that jurisdiction is proper, but the transferee court re-
verses that determination and remands the case cross-jurisdictionally.
Certainly Congress might decide that the remand order should be un-
reviewable. Yet it might also decide that the difference in the courts'
determinations signals that the parties may be in danger of losing a
warranted federal forum, and that the usual bar to review of remand
orders should be relaxed. The purposive objection holds that Congress
has already addressed these concerns, even though neither of the re-
mand statutes contemplates cross-jurisdictional remand.
3. Efficiency objection.
A third objection in favor of cross-jurisdictional remand is that it
is more efficient than retransfer: It accomplishes in the one step of
cross-jurisdictional remand what would otherwise require the two
steps of retransfer and remand. If Congress did not even contemplate
cross-jurisdictional procedures when drafting the removal and remand
provisions, one ought not resolve whatever statutory ambiguity exists
by opting for the least efficient interpretation. At the least, courts
might read Things Remembered narrowly to avoid the reconciliation
requirement,'57 so that only bankruptcy remands cannot be cross-
jurisdictionally remanded.
This efficiency objection has already been answered on formal
grounds,' but on functional grounds, the objection may be less deter-
minate than it seems. Sending cases back the way that they have come
156 See id at 450. This is an important right. For instance, the Supreme Court long ago held
that a party's right to a federal forum cannot be defeated by an opposing party's fraudulent join-
der. See Alabama Great Southern Railway Co v Thompson, 200 US 206,218 (1906) ("[T]he Fed-
eral courts may and should take such action as will defeat attempts to wrongfully deprive parties
entitled to sue in the Federal courts of the protection of their rights in those tribunals.").
157 But see Part III.A.1 (explaining why Things Remembered is difficult to distinguish).
158 See Part II.B.2.a (discussing the Ninth Circuit's interpretation in US. Refining).
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creates a system of bright-line rules for judges and clerks of the courts
to follow. The bright-line rule could be that courts may either cross-jurisdictionally remand or retransfer, but the rarity of cross-jurisdictional remand may mean that it causes more confusion than it
is worth. In addition, permitting cross-jurisdictional remand may give
rise to unintended consequences that temper any gains in efficiency.'59
For instance, the Delaware district court in Federal-Mogul, once it had
decided to remand the claims before it, was statutorily required to
mail certified copies of its remand order to the state courts from
which the claims were originally removed.'60 Faced with mailing hun-
dreds, and more probably thousands, of certified copies of its remand
order, the court instead posted the order on its website."' Complying
with Section 1447(c)'s mailing requirement would have meant surren-
dering much of the gain in efficiency that supposedly justified the re-
mand in the first instance. In short, the practice of cross-jurisdictional
remand is rare but increasingly common, and it is too early to draw
conclusions about its efficiency.
CONCLUSION
Remand across jurisdictional lines is a practice in search of ajustification. Courts have permitted cross-jurisdictional remands
under statutes that either clearly preclude or do not clearly endorse
the practice, and no court has ever attempted to reconcile these
statutes. This Comment offers an interpretation that renders the
statutes coherent and congruous, suggesting that courts should not
allow cross-jurisdictional remands.
159 See, for example, Petition for Writ of Certiorari, In re Federal-Mogul Global, Inc, No 02-
661, *23 (US filed Oct 29, 2002) (alleging that Delaware district court's cross-jurisdictional re-
mand has led to "substantial confusion ... as files have been stranded in the federal courts to
which claims were removed, and other federal courts have proceeded to remand the claims any-
way notwithstanding the Delaware court's .. cross-jurisdictional remand").
160 See 28 USC 1447(c) ("A certified copy of the order of remand shall be mailed by the
clerk to the clerk of the State court. The State court may thereupon proceed with such case.").
161 See Order Denying the Motions to Transfer the "Friction Products Claims" and Re-
manding the Friction Products Claims, In re Federal-Mogul Global, (Bankr D Del 2002 filed Feb
8,2002) online at http://www.deb.uscourts.gov/wolin2.pdf (visited Feb 28, 2003).
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